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Abstract
The great success of convolutional neural networks has caused a massive spread
of the use of such models in a large variety of Computer Vision applications. How-
ever, these models are vulnerable to certain inputs, the adversarial examples, which
although are not easily perceived by humans, they can lead a neural network to
produce faulty results. This paper focuses on the detection of adversarial examples,
which are created for convolutional neural networks that perform image classifica-
tion. We propose three methods for detecting possible adversarial examples and
after we analyze and compare their performance, we combine their best aspects to
develop an even more robust approach.
The first proposed method is based on the regularization of the feature vector
that the neural network produces as output. The second method detects adversarial
examples by using histograms, which are created from the outputs of the hidden
layers of the neural network. These histograms create a feature vector which is
used as the input of an SVM classifier, which classifies the original input either
as an adversarial or as a real input. Finally, for the third method we introduce
the concept of the residual image, which contains information about the parts of
the input pattern that are ignored by the neural network. This method aims at
the detection of possible adversarial examples, by using the residual image and
reinforcing the parts of the input pattern that are ignored by the neural network.
Each one of these methods has some novelties and by combining them we can further
improve the detection results. For the proposed methods and their combination, we
present the results of detecting adversarial examples on the MNIST dataset. The
combination of the proposed methods offers some improvements over similar state
of the art approaches.
1 Introduction
The use of Deep Learning and deep neural networks has spread in a large variety
of Computer Vision applications due to their increasingly effectiveness in solving many
difficult visual tasks. Specifically a Convolutional Neural Network, presented in [9], is
a deep learning model which is used extensively in image recognition. A Convolutional
Neural Network (CNN) consists of successive layers, where the network processes the
input patterns in different scales. These multiple levels of representation remove the
need for complex feature extraction, which transforms the raw data into a feature vector,
because a CNN can accept the raw data as input and learn how to extract the important
features internally in its first few layers. In addition, these types of neural networks take
advantage of the locality of the patterns in an image by using convolutional layers.
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However, neural networks and subsequently CNNs are vulnerable to certain inputs
as shown in [21], the adversarial examples. These inputs, although are not easily per-
ceived by humans can lead a CNN to produce faulty results. In the case of CNNs that
are used in image classification, where the input is an image, we are also referring to
adversarial examples as adversarial images. In this case, an original image, which is
classified correctly by a CNN, is slightly perturbed to produce the adversarial image.
Despite the fact that the adversarial image seems similar to the original image, according
to the perception of a human, it is classified into a different category. This means that
a user can alter the output of the network by perturbing the input in a way that it is
not detected by humans.
The existence of adversarial examples indicates that existing CNNs, although in
some specific applications can achieve near human accuracy, they do not perceive the
input in the same way as humans do. As a result, by studying adversarial examples we
can improve the models used, in order to create models that are closer to the human
perception, which we consider as the ideal solution. In fact, as shown in [7], by improving
the behavior of a neural network against adversarial examples we can also improve the
accuracy of that network for real inputs. Also adversarial examples are a vulnerability
that can be abused from a malicious user to influence the behavior of a system that
uses a vulnerable neural network. For example a physical world adversarial example [3],
can alter the perception of a self-driving car that uses cameras to navigate through the
urban environment.
There are two main approaches for combating adversarial examples. The first ap-
proach aims at making the neural network more robust against adversarial examples
[16], [22], by changing the network’s architecture and the learning procedure. The sec-
ond approach assumes that the neural network is already trained and tries to detect
whether a new input is an adversarial example or it is a real input [4], [20], [12], [11], [6].
In this paper, we focus on the second approach and we propose methods that aim to
detect adversarial inputs. Specifically, we propose three different methods for detecting
adversarial examples generated for a CNN that performs image classification. After
we analyze and compare their performance, we propose different ways of combining
their best aspects to develop a more robust approach. The first method is based on
the regularization of the feature vectors which are produced by the network. Using
the regularized feature vectors we retrain the last layer of the CNN similarly to the
adversarial training proposed in [7]. We then can detect if a new input is an adversarial
example by comparing the output of the original network with the output of the retrained
network. The second method creates histograms using the absolute values of the outputs
of the network’s hidden layers. Then by combining these histograms, this method creates
a vector which is used by an SVM classifier to classify the input either as real or as
adversarial. For the third method we assume that in a neighborhood of the input space
the CNN acts as an affine classifier. Using that assumption we introduce the concept of
the residual image, which contains information about the parts of the input pattern that
are ignored by the network. This information is then used to perturb the input image
in order to detect whether this image is a real or an adversarial input .
We use these methods and their combination to detect adversarial examples gener-
ated for a LeNet [10] network trained on the MNIST [10] dataset. The combination
of the three proposed methods offers some improvements over similar state of the art
approaches, on the detection of adversarial examples on the MNIST dataset.
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2 Notation amd Related Work
2.1 Notation
The adversarial examples examined in this paper are generated for CNNs, which
accept as input either a 2D signal of a grayscale image or a 3D signal of an RGB image.
To simplify the notation, we use an image vector x ∈ Rm to denote an input image,
where m is the total number of points of the discrete 2D or 3D signal. Each component
of the image vector x corresponds to a certain point of the discrete 2D or 3D signal.
Also, we refer to the ith component of the image vector x with x[i]. This notation is also
extended for the feature maps, which are the outputs of the hidden layers of the CNN.
When the image vector x corresponds to a grayscale image, the operation corre-
sponding to a discrete 2D convolution between the image and a kernel is done using a
convolutional matrix that is multiplied with the image vector.
2.2 Generating Adversarial Examples
In order to generate adversarial examples we assume that we have an already trained
CNN that accepts as input an image and classifies it into one of N different categories.
In particular the output of the CNN is a vector with N components, where the ith
component is the confidence of the network that the input belongs to the ith category.
In addition, we have a set of test images (not used in training) which are used as starting
points for the adversarial generation. We also refer to these test images as real images.
For the trained network, let x be the input of the network, f(x) be the output of
the network, k(x) be the category the input x is classified into and J(f(x), `) be the
classification error of the network with input x and target category label ` ∈ {1, 2, ..., N},
where N is the total number of categories into which the network can classify the input.
According to [21] if we have a real image x, which is classified into category with label `,
we can produce an adversarial image xadv = x+ r, by solving the optimization problem
min
r
c‖r‖2 − J(f(x+ r), `) (1)
s.t. : k(x) 6= k(x+ r)
where c is a parameter that controls the L2 distance between the real image x and the
adversarial image xadv.
Instead of solving the optimization problem of Equation (1), there are many proposed
methods [17],[13],[8],[1],[15] that can produce robust adversarial examples much faster.
For the experiments on this paper we are using the Basic Iterative Method [8] and the
DeepFool method [13].
2.2.1 Basic Iterative Method (BIM)
One method proposed in [7], as a faster alternative of solving the optimization problem of
Equation (1), is the Fast Gradient Sign Method. In this method the adversarial image is
produced by adding to the original image x0, which is classified into the correct category
`, the vector r, where :
r =  · sign(∇xJ(f(x0), `)) (2)
As an extension of this method, [8] proposed the Basic Iterative Method (BIM), where
the adversarial image is created by applying the fast gradient sign method several times
with a smaller step a, and also by clipping the result in each iteration in order to stay
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in a L∞ -neighbourhood of the original image x0. This means that at iteration k, the
method generates an image xk where:
xk = Clipx0,{x(k−1) + a · sign(∇xJ(f(x(k−1)), `))}, x(0) = x0 (3)
and the ith pixel of Clipx,(x
′) is computed as follows:
Clipx,(x
′)[i] = min {umax, x[i] + ,max {umin, x[i]− , x′[i]}} (4)
where x[i], x′[i] are the ith pixels of x,x′ respectively, and umin, umax are the minimum
and maximum values allowed for the input.
The BIM method terminates at iteration k, when it finds an adversarial image
xadv = xk that it is classified into a category that it is different from the original cate-
gory `.
2.2.2 DeepFool
This method proposed in [13] is an iterative method that is based on the linearization
of the classifier at each step.
Let f`(x) be the output of the trained network for the category ` when the input
is the image vector x. If we have a real image x0 which is correctly classified into the
category `0, then using the DeepFool method after k iterations we can compute the
image xk+1 as follows
` = arg min
6`=`0
|f`(xk)− f`0(xk)|
‖∇f`(xk)−∇f`0(xk)‖2
(5)
wk = ∇f`(xk)−∇f`0(xk) (6)
xk+1 = xk +
|f`(xk)− f`0(xk)|
‖wk‖22
wk (7)
This method terminates when it finds an image xk that it is classified by the neural
network into a category ` 6= `0.
2.3 Detecting Adversarial Examples
There is a large variety of different aprroaches that aim to detect possible adversarial
inputs in a deep neural network. Many of these approaches are based on the extraction of
a certain metric, using the outputs of the neural network, which is then used to distinct
between a real input and an adversarial input.
An example of two metrics that can be used for that distinction is proposed in [4].
The first metric is based on the assumption that many adversarial generating methods
produce adversarial examples that are near the low dimensional submanifold where the
real inputs lie (but not on it). As a result [4] proposes a method to model the subman-
ifolds of the real data using kernel density estimation in the feature space produced by
the last hidden layer. Therefore an adversarial input will produce a feature vector that
is located in a region where the density estimate is lower than the density estimate for
real inputs. The second metric is another approach to identify low confidence regions of
the input space. In particular, given an input x, this metric computes an estimation of
the uncertainty of a deep Gaussian process [5], using the outputs of multiple DNNs with
the same architecture that are trained in the same training set but using the dropout
4
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(a) (b) (c)
Figure 1: Columns: (a) Real input images, (b) Adversarial images produced with the
BIM method, which are misclassified by the LeNet network, (c) Adversarial images
produced with the DeepFool method, which are misclassified by the LeNet network
method. Using this metric we expect a higher uncertainty estimation when the input x
is an adversarial input.
Also a training procedure that can enhance the detection results when we use the
kernel density estimation as a metric is proposed in [14]. This training procedure adds
a regularization term called reverse cross-entropy. This term encourages the network to
produce outputs which have high confidence for the correct category and confidence that
is as uniform as possible for the other categories.
Another method that aims at the detection of possible adversarial examples is pro-
posed in [20]. This method uses the PixelCNN model [19], which is a trainable generative
model. With this model the likelihood p(x) a new image x is produced by the model can
be easily computed. Based on the observation that adversarial inputs tend to be more
unlikely to be produced by the model than real inputs, for a new image x the value of
p(x) can be used to detect whether this image is an adversarial example.
Apart from the methods that use a combination of metrics in order to detect possible
adversarial examples, there are also proposed detection methods [12],[11],[6] which train
secondary neural networks that act as classifiers, which classify an input image either as
an adversarial example or as a real input.
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3 Proposed Methods for Detecting Adversarial Examples
3.1 Regularization for detecting Adversarial Examples
This method is based on the regularization of the feature vector that the neural
network produces. For the regularization, we use the method of nonlocal discrete regu-
larization on weighted graphs proposed in [2]. Due to the fact that the outputs of the
layers closest to the final output of a CNN act as feature vectors of the input, we can
use the outputs of one of these layers as the feature vector of the input image.
3.1.1 Feature Vector Regularization
Let h(x) be the output of the second to last layer of the CNN, when the input is the
image x. For this method we are using h(x) as the feature vector of the image x, which is
extracted by the neural network. To perform the regularization of the feature vector we
create a weighted graph from a set of input images, where each vertex represents one of
the input images. In addition, we define a function g on the vertices of the graph, where
if the vertex u represents the input image x with feature vector h(x) then g(u) = h(x).
Let w(u, v) be the weight of the edge that connects the vertices u, v. The norm of the
gradient of g at a vertex u is defined by:
|∇wg(u)| =
√√√√ m∑
i=1
|∇wgi(u)|2 (8)
with
|∇wgi(u)| =
√∑
v 6=u
w(u, v)(gi(u)− gi(v))2 i = 1, 2, ...,m (9)
where gi(u) is the i
th component of g(u), which have m components. Using the above
definitions we can regularize the function g using the following algorithm:
g
(0)
i = gi (10)
g
(t+1)
i (v) =
λg
(0)
i (v) +
∑
u6=v γ
(t)
i (u, v)g
(t)
i (u)
λ+
∑
u6=v γ
(t)
i (u, v)
(11)
with
γ
(t)
i (u, v) = w(u, v)(|∇wg(t)i (u)|p−2 + |∇wg(t)i (v)|p−2) (12)
where the parameter p controls the degree of regularity which has to be preserved and
the parameter λ controls the fidelity to the original function g0.
3.1.2 Detecting Adversarial Examples using the Regularization of the feature vector
For this method we use a set of input images S that consists of real images and
adversarial images, for which we know the correct target categories Cs. Also, we have
a set of new images V for which we do not know whether there are adversarial or not.
For the images of both sets S and V we get the feature vectors that are extracted from
the trained CNN and we create a weighted graph. Using this graph we perform the
regularization that was described in section 3.1.1 using p = 1. Then we retrain the
last layer of the network, which takes as input the feature vectors, using as inputs the
regularized feature vectors only from the images of the S set and as desired outputs the
6
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correct categories Cs. A new image x ∈ V is detected as an adversarial image when
the category into which is classified from the retrained last layer, using its regularized
feature vector, is different from the category into which is classified by the original CNN.
This procedure is shown in Algorithm 1.
An important detail of this method is the weights of the edges of the graph that
are created from the input images. The weight of an edge which connects two images
can depend on either the distance between them, or the distance between their feature
vectors.
Let g(u1) be the feature vector of image x1 and g(u2) be the feature vector of image
x2. The weight of the edge between the vertices u1, u2 using the distance of the feature
vectors can be computed by:
w(u1, u2) = exp (−‖g(u1)− g(u2)‖
2
2
σ2
) (13)
When we use the distance between the two images, the weight of the edge between the
vertices u1, u2 can be computed by:
w(u1, u2) = exp (−‖x1 − x2‖
2
2
σ2
) (14)
The use of the Euclidean distance between the input images can be explained by the
fact that we want the weights to illustrate the similarity between the images. However,
the Euclidean distance expresses this similarity only when the input patterns are aligned
and they are on the same scale. In contrast, the Euclidean distance between the feature
vectors can express this similarity even when the input patterns are not aligned and have
different scales, but with the drawback that this distance can be more easily manipulated
by adversarial inputs.
In addition to the Euclidean distance we can try to use different distances to compute
the weights of the graph. So we may also use one of the following distances d:
• the cosine distance: d(x1,x2) = 1− 〈x1,x2〉‖x1‖2‖x2‖2 .
(where 〈x1,x2〉 is the inner product of x1, x2 )
• the L1 distance of the two vectors: d(x1,x2) =‖x1 − x2‖1.
In order to use the distance function d, Equation (13) can be generalized as follows:
w(u1, u2) = exp (−d(g(u1), g(u2))
2
σ2
) (15)
Also Equation (14) can be generalized as follows:
w(u1, u2) = exp (−d(x1,x2)
2
σ2
) (16)
Using Equations (15), (16) with the different distance functions d we get different results
of detecting adversarial examples.
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Algorithm 1: Generalized Algorithm for detecting adversarial examples using the
regularization of the feature vectors
Input: Set S of images with known correct categories Cs, Set V of images from
which we want to detect the adversarial examples
1 Compute the feature vectors h(S), h(V ) for the images in the sets S, V .
2 Using h(S), h(V ) and one of the Equations (15),(16) create graph G.
3 Regularize graph G using p=1, and get the regularized feature vectors
hr(S), hr(V ).
4 Retrain the last layer of the CNN using as input the feature vectors hr(S) and as
target output the categories Cs.
5 foreach x ∈ V do
6 Using the original last layer L and the original feature vector h(x), get the
classification category corig = L(h(x)),
7 Using the retrained last layer Lrt and the regularized feature vector hr(x), get
the classification category creg = Lrt(hr(x)),
8 if corig 6= creg then
9 Detect x as an adversarial image.
10 else
11 Detect x as a real image.
12 end
13 end
3.1.3 Experiments using the Regularization Method
We generate adversarial examples using the BIM method and the DeepFool method
on a LeNet [10] neural network that was trained on the MNIST dataset. From the test
set of the MNIST dataset we use 2000 images to create 2000 adversarial examples using
the BIM method and 2000 adversarial examples using the DeepFool method.
Adversarial Detection
Using Equation (15) Using Equation (16)
BIM DeepFool BIM DeepFool
Distance Precision Recall Precision Recall Precision Recall Precision Recal
L2 89.5% 66.2% 92.4% 83.7% 90.2% 67.1% 93.2% 84.4%
Cosine 90.2% 66.8% 91.9% 84.2% 90.7% 68.9% 92.7% 84.9%
L1 90% 65.7% 91.2% 84.1% 90.8% 66.1% 92.5% 84.6%
Adversarial Detection without Regularization
BIM DeepFool
Precision=86% Recall=51% Precision=88.3% Recall=69.2%
Table 1: Results of adversarial detection on the LeNet network using the Regularization
Method, when different distances are used to compute the weights of the edges of the
graph
We then use the Regularization Method that was presented in section 3.1.2 in order
to detect the adversarial images in a set of 2000 real and 2000 adversarial images, using
the different distances and the different adversarial generation methods. Also, we try
to detect the adversarial examples without using the regularization, which means that
the method retrains the last layer using the original feature vectors. When we remove
8
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the regularization of the feature vectors, retraining the last layer is similar to adversarial
training [7]. The results are shown in Table 1. Both the highest Precision and the highest
Recall in the detection is achieved when the weights are computed using Equation (16).
3.2 Histogram Method for Adversarial Detection
By comparing the outputs of the hidden layers of a CNN when the inputs are real
images and when the inputs are adversarial images, we can observe that the outputs
in these two cases have different distribution of values. In particular, we compare the
outputs of an original image and an adversarial image generated from the original. An
example of two such outputs is presented in Figure 2. We observe that in the case of the
adversarial image there is an increase in the values of some peaks of the original output
while there is a decrease in the values on the rest of the points of the output.
(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Figure 2: First column: Input images where (a) is a real image and (c) is an adversarial
image. Second column: Output of the first convolutional layer of the neural network for
the inputs of the first column. (Best viewed in color)
The difference in the distribution of the outputs can be detected using histograms
of the output values. In Figure 3, we can see histograms of the absolute values of the
outputs of the first convolutional layer from the LeNet network, when the input is a real
image and when it is an adversarial image. In these histograms we can observe that in
the case of the adversarial image, the points of the output, which have values with high
absolute value, are less than the respective points in the case of the real image.
We can use this difference in the histograms for adversarial detection. To do so, we
9
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(a) (b)
Figure 3: Histograms of the absolute values of the output when the input is: (a) the real
image of Figure 2a, (b) the adversarial image of Figure 2c.
train an SVM classifier, which takes the histogram of the absolute values of the output
of the first convolutional layer as input and predicts whether the input image is an
adversarial image or a real image.
This method is problematic when we add Gaussian noise in the input images. The
additive noise changes the distribution of the values of the outputs and as a result the
output distribution when the inputs are adversarial images becomes more similar to
the output distribution when the inputs are real images. To improve this method and
make it more robust against the addition of Gaussian noise we propose the reinforcement
step. Let f be the function that is implemented by the CNN to produce the network’s
final output and x be an input image that is classified into the category `. Using the
reinforcement step we get the new image xnew which is defined by:
xnew = x−  ∇xJ(f(x), `)‖∇xJ(f(x), `)‖2 ‖x‖2 (17)
where J(f(x), `) is the classification error of the network for input x when the target
category is `.
When the original input x is an adversarial image the reinforcement step will increase
the confidence for the adversarial category and as a result xnew will have a histogram
which is more distinct from a histogram of a real image. Similarly, when the original
input x is a real image, xnew will increase the confidence for the real category and it will
have a histogram which is more distinct from a histogram of an adversarial image. Hence,
when we use both xnew and x to produce the histograms that are used for detection, it
is easier for the SVM classifier to distinguish between real and adversarial images.
Another detail that improves the detection is, when we create the histogram from
the output of a layer which has n channels, to create one histogram for each channel
instead of creating one histogram for all the channels. As a result, when we have a layer
with n channels we get n different histograms and by combining them, we create the
final vector that will be used as the input of the SVM.
10
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Algorithm 2: Training of the SVM that is used in the Histogram method that
utilizes the reinforcement step
Input: Set {x1,x2, ...,xm} of images which are a mix of real and adversarial
images, set {a1, a2, ..., am} where ai = 1 if xi is an adversarial image and
ai = 0 otherwise
1 for i← 1 to m do
2 Generate xnew using Equation (17) and xi,
3 Compute the feature maps of the hidden layers for input xi,
4 foreach feature map fmj of the first convolutional layer do
5 Compute the histogram hj of the absolute values of fmj ,
6 end
7 Concatenate the values of all hj to create hist
8 Compute the feature maps of the hidden layers for input xnew,
9 foreach feature map fmj of the first convolutional layer do
10 Compute the histogram h′j of the absolute values of fmj ,
11 end
12 Concatenate the values of all h′j to create hist
′,
13 Concatenate the values of hist,hist′ to create Thisti
14 end
15 Train the SVM classifier using as inputs the Thisti and as outputs the ai for
i = 1, 2, ...,m.
3.2.1 Experiments using the Histogram Method
Similarly with section 3.1.3, using a LeNet network trained on the MNIST dataset
and both the BIM method and the DeepFool method we create two sets of 2000 ad-
versarial and 2000 real images. We try to detect the adversarial images using both the
original histogram method and the histogram method that utilizes the reinforcement
step. The SVM that is used for the detection is trained from a different set of 1000 real
and 1000 adversarial images generated using the BIM method. Also, we test the two
methods when we add Gaussian noise with different values of standard deviation.
Without Noise
BIM DeepFool
Precision Recall Precision Recall
Original 97.9% 96.5% 98% 96.6%
Reinforcement Step 95.5% 94.6% 95.4% 93.6%
With Noise with standard deviation 15
Original 79.7% 74.9% 80% 81.7%
Reinforcement Step 85.5% 87.2% 86.8% 90.7%
Table 2: Results of adversarial detection on the LeNet network using the original his-
togram method and the method that incorporates the reinforcement step, with and
without additive Gaussian noise on the input.
The results of the experiments when there is no additive noise and when there is
additive Gaussian noise with standard deviation 15 are presented in Table 2. Also
Figures 4a, 4b show the Precision and the Recall of the two histogram methods for
11
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different values of the standard deviation of the additive Gaussian noise. When there is
no additive noise the original method achieves better results. Nevertheless, the difference
between the methods when there is no noise is small, and because the method utilizing
the reinforcement step is much more robust to the addition of noise, we can conclude
that it is the preferable method.
(a) (b)
Figure 4: Adversarial detection results using the histogram methods for different values
of standard deviation of the additive Gaussian noise: (a) Precision of the detection (b)
Recall of the detection
3.3 Adversarial Detection using the Residual Image
For the third proposed method we first introduce the concept of the residual image.
Then, using the information of the residual image, we propose a way of detecting whether
the input image is an adversarial input by perturbing the input image.
First, we propose a simple way of utilizing the residual image for adversarial detection
(Method A) and then we present two alternative methods (Methods B,C), that achieve
better results in the detection of adversarial images on the MNIST dataset.
3.3.1 Residual Image
In a CNN the lower layers, closest to the input, act as feature extractors for the input
image. The feature vector that is produced is then used as an input for the layers closest
to the output, which are usually fully connected layers, in order to classify the input
into one of the possible categories. Given an input image, we want to find an image
related vector that if it is added to the input, it will increase the norm of its feature
vector without changing its direction. Let h be the function that it is implemented by
the lower layers and associates the input with a feature vector, x0 be the original input
and h(x0) = p be the feature vector. We want to find a vector δ for which
h(x0 + δ) = (1 + )p  > 0 (18)
12
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(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Figure 5: First row: Input images where image (a) is a real input and image (b) is an
adversarial input. Second row: (c) Vector δ from Equation (18) when the input image is
the real image. (d) Vector δ from Equation (18) when the input image is the adversarial
image.
We can easily find the vector δ by using the backpropagation algorithm. As an
example, by using a LeNet network trained on the MNIST dataset and the input images
shown in Figures 5a,5b, we can compute the respective vectors δ which are shown in
Figures 5c,5d. We can see that for the input image of Figure 5a, which is a correctly
classified real image, the vector δ resembles a /9/ digit, which is the correct category
of the input image. In contrast, for the adversarial input image of Figure 5b, which
is classified falsely as a /7/ digit, the vector δ more closely resembles a pattern of the
adversarial category than a pattern of the correct category. Therefore, in a way the
vector δ shows us the pattern that is perceived by the network.
This observation can be interpreted as follows: Due to the fact that the nonlinearities
used in a CNN (e.g. Max Pooling, ReLU) are piecewise linear, in a neighborhood close
to an input image the network acts as an affine classifier. This means that if we get
the output h(x0) of the network, which is the feature vector of image x0, we can find a
matrix W and a vector b so that
h(x0) = Wx0 + b (19)
Given the input image x0, the final layers of the neural network perceive that in-
put as the feature vector hx0 = h(x0). Hence the neural network perceives the sim-
ilarity between image x0 and a new image x, which has feature vector hx, as the
13
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inner product hTx0hx. When these two inputs activate the nonlinearities of the neu-
ral network with the same way, we can use Equation (19) to compute the inner product
hTx0hx as follows:
hTx0hx = h
T
x0Wx+ h
T
x0b (20)
According to Equation (20) the similarity between the two images depends on the
inner product of the new image x with the image W Thx0 . Hence the image W
Thx0 ,
which is produced by the backpropagation, can be interpreted as the pattern that is
perceived by the network and it is used to find the similarity between the image x0 and
the new image x.
Let y = [y1, y2, ..., yN ]
T be the final output of the neural network, which classifies
the input into N different categories, where yi is the confidence of the network that
the correct category of the input is the category i. Similarly with Equation (19), in a
neighborhood of the input space where the nonlinearities are activated with the same
way, we can find a matrix A and a vector d so that for the input image x the output
y = f(x) can be computed as follows:
y =

y1
y2
...
ym
 = Ax+ d (21)
We can find which parts of the input pattern the neural network ignores by using the
residual image xign, which is the projection of the input image x onto the null space of
matrix A. Also, we can get the perceived image xp = x−xign which shows us the parts
of the pattern perceived by the network.
3.3.2 Detecting Adversarial Examples using the Residual Image
Ideally a classifier, in order to classify a pattern of an image into one category must
perceive the entire pattern. This means that in an ideal classifier we would expect that
the norm of the residual image xign will be close to zero. In reality this does not happen
and the norm of xign stays high even for images of the training set. Nevertheless, what
we can observe is that between a real image and a adversarial image generated by the
real one, the norm of the ignored image xign increases as we go from the real image to
the adversarial image.
In the case of adversarial images, as we have shown in the section 3.3.1, the perceived
image xp resembles more the adversarial category. This means that the residual image
xign contains valuable information for the distinction between the adversarial category
and the real category, which is lost due to the fact that the classifier perceives only the xp
image. The method of detecting adversarial examples is based on this observation and
tries to add the lost information of the residual image xign, so that it is not ignored by
the classifier. In particular adding the information of the residual image into the original
image, regardless if the original image is real or adversarial, will increase the confidence
of the classifier for the correct category. As a result, in the case of an adversarial image,
which is at first classified into the adversarial category, we will observe a decrease of the
confidence for the adversarial category and an increase of the confidence for the correct
category.
Let x be the original image and xign be the residual image. Because in a neigh-
borhood close to the image x the output y of the network can be computed using
14
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(a) (b) (c) (d)
Figure 6: Column: (a) Adversarial input images, (b) Perceived images xp, (c) Residual
images xign, (d) Gradient of the classification error of the network when the input is the
adversarial image and the target category is the category the input is original classified
into
Equation (21) and xign belongs to the null space of matrix A, when we add xign to x
the output of the network does not change.
If the input x is classified by the network into the category `, then if we add or
subtract the gradient of the classification error grad = ∇xJ(f(x), `), we can achieve the
greatest change in the error of the classifier. Because the greatest change can be achieved
either by adding or subtracting grad, we can use the information of the residual image
xign to determine the direction that increases the confidence for the correct category.
In the next sections we propose different methods, which can be used to combine the
information of xign and the information of grad, in order to find the image xadd that
we will add to the image x .
3.3.3 Method A
In the first method, at each pixel, we take the value of grad and the sign of xign. The
image xadd we want to add is defined by:
xr = R(xign) (22)
xadd = sign(xr  grad) grad (23)
where R is a regularization function and  is used to refer to the entrywise product of
two vectors.
Although the regularization in Equation (22) is optional, the results from the experi-
ments showed that by regularizing the residual image xign we can achieve an improvement
in the adversarial detection. In the experiments presented in section 3.3.6 we use Total
Variation Regularization [18] in order to regularize the residual image xign.
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Method A starts with an image x0, which is classified into category `, and perturbs it
by iteratively adding xadd which is computed using Equations (22),(23). After a certain
number of iterations (Tmax) the image xfinal, that is produced, is used as an input to
compute the output s = softmax(f(xfinal)), which is the output of the CNN after it
goes through a softmax layer. Then the method detects the original image x0 as an
adversarial image if the softmax output for category ` is below a certain threshold θ.
This procedure is shown in Algorithm 3. A weakness of this method is that with the way
it computes xp, xign, there is not a clear distinction between the parts of the pattern
that are perceived and the parts that are ignored.
Algorithm 3: Method A
Input: Image vector x0 that we want to detect if it is an adversarial input
1 Compute category ` into which x0 is classified from the CNN.
2 xcur(0)← x0.
3 for t← 0 to (Tmax − 1) do
4 Compute xign for the input xcur(t),
5 Using xign and Equations (22),(23), compute xadd,
6 xcur(t+ 1)← xcur(t) +  · xadd,
7 end
8 s` ← softmax(f(xcur(Tmax)))` (the softmax output for the category `)
9 If (s` < θ) detect x0 as an adversarial example
3.3.4 Method B
In order to make a clearer distinction between the parts of the pattern ignored and
the parts perceived, this alternative method alters the way we compute the residual
image. We denote this alternative residual image as x˜ign.
Using Equation (21) we can find the projection of the input x onto the null space of
matrix A as follows:
xign = x−A†(y − d) (24)
where A† is the pseudoinverse of matrix A
With the alternative way of computing the residual image, we want the perceived
image to be a clear depiction of a pattern that belongs to the category into which the
input is classified. To achieve that, we want to change the output y of the network and
subsequently using Equation (24) to change the residual image. We find that in the case
of images that belong to the training set there is a clearer distinction between perceived
and ignored images. Therefore we want to make the output of the network to resemble
the output of the images of the training set.
To achieve that, we take the outputs of the training set and using the kmeans
algorithm we find the centers of the clusters that these outputs create. Then given
the original output y we find the output ycent which is the center closest to y. The
alternative residual images x˜ign is defined by :
x˜ign = x−A†(ycent − d) (25)
Hence, by replacing xign with x˜ign in the steps described in Method A, we get the
alternative Method B, which is presented in Algorithm 4. This method improves the
results of the detection, but produces an additive image xadd that is still noisy, which
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means that after a certain number of iterations the results of the detection using this
method start to get worse.
Algorithm 4: Method B
Input: Image vector x0, Set {yc0 ,yc1 , ...,ycM } with the centers of the clusters of
the outputs produced by the images of the training set
1 Compute category ` into which x0 is classified from the CNN.
2 xcur(0)← x0.
3 for t← 0 to (Tmax − 1) do
4 Compute output y for the input xcur(t),
5 Find center ycent that is the closest to y,
6 x˜ign ← xcur(t)−A†(ycent − d),
7 xadd ← sign(x˜ign  grad) grad,
8 xcur(t+ 1)← xcur(t) +  · xadd,
9 end
10 s` ← softmax(f(xcur(Tmax)))` (the softmax output for the category `)
11 If (s` < θ) detect x0 as an adversarial example
3.3.5 Method C
The iterative methods A,B, presented in the previous sections, do not converge to
a final image and after a certain number of iterations they start to diverge. This is
illustrated in Figure 7, where although at the first few iterations the image produced
by method B is classified into the correct category for both the real and the adversarial
image, after a certain number of iterations the confidence of the network about the
correct category starts to decrease.
To solve this problem, we change the way we compute both the residual image xign
and the image xadd that we add during the method. Let x0 be an original input image,
xcur be an image that is produced by the method from the original image x0, and xp be
the perceived image when the input is the xcur image. The alternative images xˆign,xˆadd
are defined by:
xˆign =
(x0  xcur)− (x0  xp)
‖x0‖2 (26)
xˆadd = |xˆign  grad|  sign(xˆign) (27)
where  is used to refer to the entrywise product of two vectors.
These equations emphasize the differences between xcur and xp, at the points where
the absolute values of the original image are high.
Another detail that improves the results of the detection is to confine the values of
the input image to a certain range, by setting a minimum value umin and a maximum
value umax. Let xcur(t)[i] be the i
th pixel of the image xcur(t), then:
xcur(t+ 1)[i] = max(min(xcur(t)[i] +  · xˆadd[i], vmax), vmin) (28)
By replacing xign,xadd with xˆign,xˆadd in the steps described in Method A and chang-
ing the way we compute xcur(t + 1) according to Equation (28), we get the alternative
Method C, which is presented in Algorithm 5. We can see how this method improves the
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convergence in Figure 8, where in contrast to the Method B, by increasing the iterations
we do not observe a decrease in the confidence for the correct category.
Algorithm 5: Method C
Input: Image vector x0, minimum value umin and maximum value umax
1 Compute category ` into which x0 is classified from the CNN.
2 xcur(0)← x0.
3 for t← 0 to (Tmax − 1) do
4 Compute xp for the input xcur(t),
5 Using xp, xcur(t) and Equations (26), (27), compute xˆadd,
6 Update xcur(t+ 1) , using Equation (28) .
7 end
8 s` ← softmax(f(xcur(Tmax)))` (the softmax output for the category `)
9 If (s` < θ) detect x0 as an adversarial example
(a) (b)
Figure 7: Confidence of the classifier about the correct category when Method B is used:
(a) for a real image, (b) for an adversarial image
(a) (b)
Figure 8: Confidence of the classifier about the correct category when Method C is used:
(c) for a real image, (d) for an adversarial image
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(a) (b) (c) (d)
Figure 9: Comparison between the visual results of Methods A,B,C: (a) Original input
images, (b) Images produced after the termination of Method A, (c) Images produced
after the termination of Method B, (d) Images produced after the termination of Method
C
3.3.6 Experiments with the proposed methods that use the residual image
We use the three different methods that were presented in sections 3.3.3, 3.3.4, 3.3.5
in order to detect the adversarial images in two sets of images, where each set contains
2000 real images and 2000 adversarial images. The experiments are using the LeNet
network that is trained on the MNIST dataset and similarly with sections 3.1.3, 3.2.1
the adversarial images for each set are generated using either the BIM method or the
DeepFool method.
The results of the three methods using the residual image are presented in Table 3.
It is clearly shown how the two alternative methods B,C improve the overall results
of the detection when we compare them with the original method A. Also, it is worth
noticing the fact that all the methods achieve much higher Recall, when they try to detect
adversarial examples generated using the DeepFool method, compared to the Recall they
achieve when they detect adversarial examples generated using the BIM method. This
difference indicates that the adversarial examples generated from the DeepFool method
are more sensitive to the perturbations applied by Methods A,B,C, and as a result, it is
easier to enhance the correct category when the input image is an adversarial example
generated from this method.
One parameter that can greatly affect the results of these three methods is the
threshold value θ presented in Algorithms 3, 4, 5. The detection results presented in
Table 3 use the following threshold values:
• Method A: θ = 0.9
• Method B: θ = 0.65
• Method C: θ = 0.7
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Adversarial Detection
BIM DeepFool
Precision Recall Precision Recall
Method A 68% 70.1% 73.5% 91.5%
Method B 84.6% 81.8% 86.7% 95.4%
Method C 87.6% 87.9% 88.4% 94.7%
Table 3: Adversarial detection results on the LeNet network using methods A,B,C.
(a) (b)
Figure 10: Precision-Recall curves of adversarial detection using Methods A,B,C when
the adversarial examples are generated using: (a) the BIM method, (b) the DeepFool
method. (Best viewed in color)
By changing the threshold value, we can change the Precision and the Recall of the
methods according to the needs of each application. Generally, when we increase the
threshold value, the detection becomes more sensitive and as a result the Precision in-
creases, but at the same time the Recall decreases. In contrast, when we decrease the
threshold value we observe a decrease in Precision and an increase in Recall. Therefore
the best threshold value for the adversarial detection depends on how much each appli-
cation values precision over recall. Figures 10a, 10b present the precision-recall curves
for methods A,B,C , where we can observe the relationship between Precision and Recall
for different threshold values.
In section 4, where we combine all the proposed methods, we use the same threshold
values that were used to generate the results shown in Table 3.
4 Combining the results from the proposed methods
In order to combine the results of the methods described in sections 3.1, 3.2, 3.3,
it is useful to examine the common mistakes made from these methods. Hence we
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(a) (b)
(c)
Figure 11: Common errors between the proposed methods: histogram method(hist),
regularization method(reg), residual image method(ign). (Best viewed in color)
use the same set of 2000 real and 2000 adversarial images and we try to detect the
adversarial examples using each one of these methods. For the regularization method
the weights are computed using the cosine distance between the input images, according
to Equation (16), for the histogram method the reinforcement step is used and for the
method utilizing the residual image Method C is used. The results are illustrated in
Figure 11.
These results show that each one of the three methods has a percentage of mistakes
which are unique to the method. Another useful observation is that although the his-
togram method has the lowest number of false positive mistakes, where real images are
detected as adversarial images, the majority of these falsely detected images are not
detected as adversarial images by the other two methods. In contrast the other two
methods have a large number of common false positive mistakes.
Let R(x) be the result of the regularization method, which takes the boolean value
of 1 if the input image x is detected as an adversarial image by the method. Similarly,
let H(x) be the result of the histogram method, I(x) the result of the method that uses
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the residual image and T (x) the final result of detection after the combination of the
three methods. Also we are using the symbol ∨ for the logical OR and the symbol ∧ for
the logical AND. Firstly, we identify an image as adversarial when it is detected by all
the methods, which means that T1(x) = (R(x) ∧H(x) ∧ I(x)). In this case, we expect
to achieve the highest Precision but also the lowest Recall. In contrast if we identify
an image as adversarial when it is detected by at least one method, which means that
T2(x) = (R(x) ∨ H(x) ∨ I(x)), then we will have the highest Recall with the lowest
Precision. In addition if we identify an image as adversarial when it is detected by at
least 2 methods , T3(x) = ((H(x)∧R(x))∨ (H(x)∧ I(x))∨ (R(x)∧ I(x)), then we have
intermediate results for both the Precision and the Recall.
In addition, in order to achieve high Precision without substantially decreasing the
Recall, we can use the observation that the majority of the False Positive errors of the
histogram method are unique to the method. So we identify an image as adversarial
when it is detected as adversarial by the histogram method and by at least one of the
other two methods, which means that T4(x) = (H(x) ∧ (R(x) ∨ I(x))). The results of
these combinations are shown in Table 4.
Result from the combination of the methods
BIM DeepFool
T Precision Recall Precision Recall
T1 = R ∧H ∧ I 99.5% 60.1% 99.6% 77.2%
T2 = R ∨H ∨ I 83.6% 99.4% 83.7% 99.7%
T3 = ((R ∧H) ∨ (R ∧ I) ∨ (H ∧ I)) 95.5% 91.8% 96.2% 96.25%
T4 = H ∧ (R ∨ I) 98.8% 89.6% 98.9% 92.7%
Table 4: Results of adversarial image detection on the LeNet network using different
combinations of the proposed methods.
Finally, we can compute the detection results of the combination of the proposed
methods when we allow the threshold value θ, of the method that utilizes the residual
image, to change. If we use different values for θ and we compute the detection results
using the combinations T1, T2, T3 , we can create a ROC curve, which illustrates how
we can change the sensitivity of the detection by changing both the threshold value θ
and the way we combine the three proposed methods. The ROC curves, which show
the detection results when we try to detect adversarial images produced by the BIM
and the DeepFool method, are presented in Figure 12a. In addition, the respective
Precision-Recall curves are presented in Figure 12b
For the ROC curves the Area Under Curve (AUC) is AUCBIM = 98.7% when we
detect adversarial images that are generated using the BIM method, and AUCDeepFool =
99.3% when we detect adversarial images that are generated using the DeepFool method.
These results of adversarial image detection on the MNIST dataset compare favorably
to the results of similar state of the art detection methods [4], [20], which were briefly
presented in section 2.3 and use a combination of metrics in order to detect adversarial
images.
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(a) (b)
Figure 12: (a) ROC curves of adversarial image detection, (b) Precision-Recall curves,
which are generated by using different combinations of the proposed methods and dif-
ferent threshold values θ for the method that utilizes the residual image. (Best viewed
in color)
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we introduced three methods for detecting adversarial inputs in a
CNN. Each one of these methods has some novelties and their combination yields an
even more robust approach. The first method is based on adversarial retraining of
the last layer of the network, and uses regularization of the input of the last layer to
increase the effectiveness of the retraining. The second method uses the histograms
of the values of the outputs of the hidden layers of the network in order to detect
the adversarial inputs. Finally, in the third method we introduced the residual image,
which gives us information about the parts of the input pattern that are ignored by the
classifier. Using this information we perturb the input image in order to reinforce the
correct category, something that allows us to detect the adversarial images which are
not originally classified into the correct category.
After comparing the results of each individual method we showed how the combi-
nation of these methods improves the overall detection. This combination produces
promising results and offers some improvements over similar approaches, when it is used
for the detection of adversarial images on the MNIST dataset.
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